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13 JUL 1949

The Honorable Pat McCarran  
Chairman, Senate Committee on the Judiciary  
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Chairman:

This is to acknowledge receipt of your letter of 30 June 1949 requesting answers to certain questions contained therein for inclusion in the public record of the Immigration and Naturalization Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary.

I wish to point out that Section 102(d)(3) of the National Security Act of 1947 (Public Law 253 - 80th Congress) which established the Central Intelligence Agency, specifically provides that the Agency shall have no police, law-enforcement or internal security powers and functions. For this reason our answer to Question 1 of your letter, concerning the list of 100 foreigners which you attached, is restricted to our knowledge of the activities of these persons abroad and not to their activities in the United States. The latter information is completely within the jurisdiction of other agencies of the Government.

Similarly, our answer to Question 2 of your letter is based on typical patterns and backgrounds of subversive activity engaged in by Soviet and Satellite diplomatic officials abroad.

In view of the reasons set forth above, we have not given detailed answers to your Questions 3 and 4. However, the patterns set forth in our answer to Question 2 may well be duplicated in this country. The extent to which it is being done, however, and the details of this apparatus lie completely within the jurisdiction of the FBI of the Department of Justice, and detailed answers, if available, must come from them in view of the legal limitations on CIA as to internal security functions.

Question 1: "How many of the persons whose names appear on the attached list have been engaged in subversive activity prior to their assumption of official duty in the United States as affiliates of international

organizations or as officials or employees of foreign governments? The term 'subversive activity' as used in this question denotes active participation in foreign intelligence organizations or active Communist organizational work, rather than mere membership in the Communist Party."

Answer: In view of the definition of "subversive activity" contained in this question, we have organized our answer in accordance with this definition.

a. Thirty-two of the individuals named in your attached list have reportedly or allegedly been engaged in active work for the intelligence services of their respective countries.

b. Twenty-nine of the individuals named in your attached list are high-ranking Communist Party officials. It must be assumed that by virtue of their positions they are working ardently for the benefit of their governments. This activity, by definition, and in the light of known Communist methods, must be considered to be subversive and against the interests of the United States.

c. Twenty-one of the individuals named in your attached list have reportedly or allegedly been engaged in active Communist organizational work of an underground or subversive nature outside their homelands.

d. Fifteen of the individuals named in your attached list are not included in our files with data pertinent to the questions asked.

e. Three of the individuals named in your attached list reportedly show definite pro-American sympathies and/or disaffection with Communist ideology.

Question 2: "Describe a typical pattern or typical patterns of such subversive activity and a typical background or typical backgrounds of such persons who have been engaged in such subversive activity."

Answer: Typical Pattern - a. Reporting on political, economic, industrial and military conditions of the country concerned. This activity is carried out both through the collection of overt information from newspapers, periodicals, or radio, and through agents placed within strategic installations. As a corollary to this activity, an attempt is made to recruit and place agents against the time when the diplomatic official is required to return to his homeland.

b. Arrangement of communications facilities through which agents can make their reports either to Soviet or Satellite diplomatic installations within the country, or directly to the homeland. In this connection, reports have been received of attempts of these officials to organize Communist Party cells among seamen serving on vessels sailing to the homeland. These seamen are then utilized as couriers.

c. Surveillance of, and controlling, the activities of Soviet and Satellite diplomatic personnel assigned to the country concerned as well as the activities of delegates from the homeland who enter the country to attend conventions or meetings, assuring that such personnel do not defect or become politically unreliable through contact with Western influences.

d. Disseminating party line propaganda within the foreign country. Also sending propaganda about conditions in the country back to the homeland in the form of articles designed to encourage unfavorable sentiment against the country.

e. Work with immigrant groups who have settled in the country from the homeland or with citizens with former homeland connections. This activity is apparently regarded as particularly important. Attempts are made to activate Communist groups within immigrant elements. Immigrants are encouraged to send the more stable currency of the country back to the homeland where, when exchanged at an official rate, it represents a considerable income for the homeland government. Efforts are made to recruit immigrants to work for the homeland government and to use their established businesses, such as shipping or export-import firms, as a cover for the intelligence activities of the

homeland. Networks are organized within immigrant groups in order to check native personnel abroad, to control immigrants and former natives and indoctrinate them in the party line. Strong efforts are made to break up any anti-Soviet or anti-Satellite sentiments among immigrant groups. Attempts are also made to establish financial and commercial contacts with the immigrant groups for the benefit of the homeland.

f. Act as intermediaries between the Communist Party of the foreign country concerned and the Communist Party of the homeland. Maintain communications and often procure funds for the homeland Communist Party.

g. Organize pressure groups within the foreign country concerned in order to combat certain political or military measures being considered by that country which are deemed unfavorable toward the Soviet-Satellite axis.

It has also been noted that Satellite diplomatic officials operating in a foreign country with a subversive or espionage mission usually maintain close contact with and may be directed by Soviet representatives in that country.

Typical Background - Soviet and Satellite diplomatic officials who have been selected to carry out espionage or subversive activities in foreign countries vary widely in their backgrounds, qualifications, and training. A study, however, of available background information has disclosed certain characteristics which it may be of interest to note.

Primarily, the official chosen is an individual in whom the Communist regime of his homeland places the greatest confidence as to political reliability. He is often an old line Communist who has served the Party faithfully over a period of years. Many of these Satellite officials have spent some time in the Soviet Union and some have served in the Soviet Army. Others have gained their position in the Communist hierarchy through their service with Partisan guerrillas during the war.

Many of the officials have records of long time diplomatic careers in the service of their countries. These often are described as unscrupulous and opportunistic individuals who find it to their advantage to serve faithfully the regime in power. That they serve well is implicit in the confidence which the Communists apparently place in them.

It is of interest to note that many of these officials have had legal training and have practiced as lawyers. Quite a few also have journalistic backgrounds. Not much mention is made of technical espionage training, although it may be assumed that many, particularly the old line Communists and those who have visited the USSR, have received indoctrination of this type.

It is of further interest that the wives of many of these men are ardent Communists in their own right and occasionally even act as agents themselves. They are mentioned as exerting strong influences on their husbands.

In conclusion, these officials do not appear to be, in most cases, men of high moral standards or idealistic motivation. Many of them are described as clever, unscrupulous, opportunistic, ambitious, and given to shady financial deals or occasional black-marketing.

I hope that this information may be of value to you in connection with your Subcommittee's investigation. If there is any further assistance which I can render, please feel free to call upon me in this connection.

Sincerely yours,

*John H. Hillenkoetter*

R. H. HILLENKOETTER  
REAR ADMIRAL, USN  
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

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Signer  
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